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EVIDENCE; LETTERS; ANSWERS ADMITTED WITHOUT PREVIOUS
LETTERS.
In .New Hampshire Trust Co. v. Korsemeyer Plumbing

and Heating Co., 78 N. W. 303 (Nebraska, February 9, 1899), it

was decided that a letter written in answer to another is admissible
as evidence if fairly self-explanatory, although the letter which it
answers is not offered along with it. The failure to produce the
prior letter, it is said, may affect the weight of the letter but not
its admissibility. In the opinion, Irvine, C. J., cites in approval
the cases of Barymore v. Taylor, I Esp. 326 (179-5),

and De-

Medina v. Owen, 3 Car. & K. 72 (I85o), and states that Greenleaf
on Evidence and Underhill on Evidence both give the rule otherwise,
relying on Phillips Walson v. Mfoore, I Car. & K. 626 (1845).
Upon first consideration this question would necessarily seem to
be of almost daily occurrence, yet the text books are nearly bare of
460
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-citations. The case of
tzlson v. Aloore, above mentioned, or
Watson v. Moore, as it appears in the English Common Law Reports, is of no great value. Plaintiffs counsel was stopped by
Baron Pollock in the reading of a letter written by the defendant,
the opening words having indicated that it was an answer to a letter
of the plaintiff, and directed the other letter to be offered first,
which was done. This case is given in Greenleaf in a note under
section 201. The rule there laid down on its authority is followed
by Lester v. Sutton, 7 Mich. 329 (1859), but so far as can be
ascertained by no other cases.
In the first case cited by the court, Lord Barrymore v. Taylor,
i Esp. 326 (795), objection was made to the reading of certain
letters unless the letters to which they were the answers were first
produced, but Lord Kenyon said that there was no rule of law that
required such evidence, that if opposing counsel thought them
necessary to explain the transaction, he might produce them as
they were in his client's possession. .DeMedina v. Owen, 3 Car.
& K. 72, decided by Baron Parke some fifty years after, was also
to the same effect. In Brayley v. Jones, 33 Iowa, 508 (z84I)i in
answer to such an objection, the court said: "This may be the
rule if the first letter is necessary to the understanding of the one
offered, and will aid in the better understanding of it; or where it
appears that the answer may be misunderstood without the letter to
which it is a reply being read. But if the letter offered in evidence
contains distinct and independent propositions or statements of
facts which cannot be misunderstood if read alone, and are in no
way dependent on the first letter, we are of opinion that it is admissible without the conditions suggested by counsel."
But is it not sufficient that it be intelligible when taken with the
rest of the testimony? In Beech v. The Railroad,37 N. Y. 457
(1868) it was held, with much reason, that the meaning of a letter
might be ascertained from other evidence in the case, and the other
authorities on the admissibility of letters do not make such a
qualification.
Stone v. Sanborn, 104 Mass. 319 (1870), was an action for
breach of promise of marriage. The plaintiff's counsel offered
some of defendant's letters and some of plaintiff's, making selections of such as he desired to put in. The defendant objected, but
the trial judge permitted them to be read. One of these letters
appeared to be in reply and in reference to the contents of a letter
of the plaintiff's, which was not put in. On appeal this ruling
was affirmed, Gray, J., saying: "If the letters which she introduced showed that they were written in reply to other letters, she
might doubtless give in evidence those letters, too, as tending to
explain the replies. She was not, however, bound to do so, but
might leave it to defendant, upon cross-examination or otherwise,
to offer any competent evidence of them or their contents if he
wished. If the ruling of Chief Baron Pollock in Watson v. Aloore,
i C. & K. 625, cited for the defendant, that the party offering the
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reply in evidence should put in both the letters or neither, was
anything more than an exercise of discrbtion, as to the order of
proof it is more than counter balanced by the opinion of Lord
Kenyon in the earlier case of Barrymore v..Taylor, I Esp. 326,
and of Baron Parke in the later one of DeMedina v. Owen, 3 C.
& K. 72. In Crary v. Pollard, 14 Allen, 284 (z867), the reply
was held admissible as evidence of notice to the party to whom it
was addressed, without producing the letter to which it referred;
4nd the question whether it was admissible for any other purpose
was not considered. When a particular communication which
refers to a previous one is not introduced as containing the terms
of a contract, we see no more reason for obliging the party offering
it to put in the previous communication also, when the communications are written than when they are oral. In either case,
whether the communications are by successive letters or by distinct
conversations, the party introducing the second in evidence may
introduce the'first also, and if he does not the other party may.
The actual custody of the paper does not affect the question which
party shall introduce them but only the steps to compel their
production. "
Again, in North Berwick Co. v. Ins. Co., 52 Me. 336 (1863),
it was said that the plaintiffs were under no obligations to offer more
of the letters of defendants' agent than they should deem conducive
to .their interest. See, also, New/on v. Price, 41 Ga. z86 (1870) ;
Taylor on Evidence, Sec. 734; Wharton on Evidence, Sec. 1103.
Where such a letter contains an admission, it must be clear that
it should be accepted irrespective of the fact that it is in answer to
another. Thus, in Woggin v. RailroadCo., 120 Mass. 2ox (1876),
plaintiffs declared in tort for the conversion of one hundred and
fourteen bushels of oats taken by defendant's agent from a freight
car to reduce the shipment to the amount at which the car had
been billed. Plaintiffs offered in evidence a letter of the agent in
reply of one of theirs admitting the removal of the oats, not giving
quantity. The Supreme Court held that, as it contained a declaration of an agent within the scope of his authority, it was competent as offered.
In an action of trespass for some cases of rubber shoes, which
plaintiff claimed had been consigned on commission, against a constable who had taken possession of them under an attachment against
the consignees, certain letters of theirs admitting this fact were
offered in evidence. They appeared to be in reply to others written
by the plaintiff. Defendants objected to their admission, but the
Supreme Court of Vermont held that they were properly received:
HaywardRubber Co. v. Duncklee, 30 Vt. 29 (1858).
CRIMINAL LAW; FORMER TRIAL; CHANGE IN FORM OF INDICTMENT.
State v. Adams, 78 N. W. 353 (South Dakota). Adams

was indicted for rape and convicted. Upon appeal, the Supreme
Court first denied him a new trial, but later, since the prosecuting
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witness was proved to have been more than sixteen at the time laid
in the information, the court arrested the judgment upon its own
motion and ordered the defendant to be held in custody ten days
for the purpose of such further criminal proceedings as might be
instituted against him. The state then brought a new information
against Adams for the same offence, charged in identical language,
except for the fact that the date of the offence was changed from
August 30, 1896, to December 20, 1895. The prisoner was convicted after having entered a plea of former jeopardy; and the
Supreme Court, upon appeal, held that the defendant had been tried
for the same offence and that his plea should have been sustained.
T1he court's decision in the present case is open to serious objection. The constitutional provision, according to the authorities,
does not mean that a man may not be tried twice for rape, arson
or any other offence at law ; but, to use the words of Judge Cooley,
"by the same offence is not signified the same eo nomine, but the
same- criminal act or omission :" Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 326 (note).
See, also, IV Blackstone, 336. In the present
case there were clearly two separate criminal acts, for the defendant
was convicted, before a jury, of committing the offence upon
August 30, 1896, and was found guilty of a similar offence upon
December 20, 1895. The jury's verdict, upon each trial, was final
so far as the fact was concerned.
The reasoning of the Michigan Court in the case of People v.
Gaull, 104 Mich. 575 (I89O), can well be applied to the present
case. There a man had been indicted for illegally selling liquor
upon May xst, and set up as a defence the fact that he had been
convicted of the same offence committed upon June 3oth. The
court said: "the offence with which the defendant is charged was
complete on May 1st. Had a prosecution then been instituted for
this offence and the respondent thereafter arrested for a like offence
committed upon June 3oth, it is conceded that the prosecution for
the prior offence would not constitute a bar, and we are unable to
see why, in reversing the facts, the same rule does not obtain."
For the same doctrine, see U S. v. Show, 9 Pac. (Utah) 686;
Com. v. W'alker, 3 Dist. Ct. Rep. (Pa.) 348 (1894) ; Fleming v.
Stale (Tex.), 12 S. W. 605; Reedv. State (Tex.), 29 S. W. io85;
Peo. v. Sinne/I (N. Y.), 3o N. E. 47 ; Evans v. State (Ark.), i5
S. W. 360; Vowells v. Com., 83 Ky. 193.
The case that comes most nearly to sustaining the decision in
question is that of Com. v. GjTF, 66 Mo. App. 49, (1896). There,
to an indictment for illegal liquor selling in September, the defendant pleaded an acquittal of the same offence alleged to have
been committed upon November 17, 1893. The plea was sustained, but the court expressly said that there was evidence "tending to show that the prosecuting witness' testimony before the
justice and upon this proceeding referred to the same transaction."
In the present case, the jury's verdict showed that the same transaction was not in question.
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There is another class of cases, illustrated by Com. v. Goulet,
r6o Mass. 276 (1894), where former jeopardy is held to be a good
plea. For instance, where a man is indicted for an offence committed upon November 2oth and pleads a former acquittal upon an
indictment, charging him with the same crime upon July ist and
divers days between that day and November 2 st. This case is
clearly not analogous to the present. It comes under the rule that
a man cannot be tried under a second indictment, where the facts
alleged in the second indictment, if proved, would have convicted
under the first. How does this rule apply to the present case?
Evidence showing an offence committed upon December 20, 1895,
could not convict the defendant of a crime alleged to have occurred
upon August So, 1896.
ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO MURDER; EVIDENCE AS TO PREVIOUS
DIFFICULTY; SELF-DEFENCE. In Ellis v. ZYhe State (Ala.), 25 So.
I (1899), appellant was convicted in the court below on an indictment charging assault with intent to murder. It appeared that the
prosecutor was going along the highway when the defendant came
up and stabbed him with a knife, saying " You told Mr. Chestnut."
On a previous night the prosecutor had been put to watch certain
property belonging to Mr. Chestnut where thefts had recently occurred. While on guard there he detected defendant and another
man approaching, shot at them, but without effect, and reported
the matter to his master. This evidence of a previous difficulty
was introduced to show motive on the par.t of the accused. For
the'defendant the plea of self-defence was made. The verdict in
the lower court was for the state. On appeal to the State Supreme
Court, Dowdell, J., held, that the use of the word "'entirely" by
the trial judge in explaining the meaning of self-defence in these
terms " that in order to be acquitted on that ground, defendant
must be entirely free from fault in bringing on the difficulty" was
correct.
The appellate judge's ruling that the defendant must have been
entirely free from fault if he wishes to set up the claim of selfdefence seems at first rather harsh. To say that there is a difference
between "entirely free" and simply "free"
from fault is not
hypocritical (as the judge here insists), but when the personal
equation of the average juryman is considered, an important distinction. The following example will illustrate briefly the difference between these two phrases and the force they would have on
one not acquainted with legal terms. A man wishing and intending
to create a combat with another, meets him on the road and makes
insulting and derisive remarks to him on the spot, and the second
comer, possibly in the first heat of passion, attacks the first man.
In such a case the first man could hardly be said to be entirclr free
from fault, but, nevertheless, his conduct is from a legal point of
view faultless, for mere remarks are no justification for an assault.
In other jurisdictions there seems to be a more liberal interpre-
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tation of this rule than is shown in the principal case. This is
.shown in the case of The State v. Maguire, 69 Mo. 197, where a
much more lenient wording of the same rule was accepted. There
it was said "Iaperson who brings on a difficulty cannot avail himself of the right of self-defence." And in an Illinois case, Ifulse
v. Tohman, 49 111. App. 490, on the same point the Appellate
Court held, "The law will not permit him (the defendant) to provoke or bring on a difficulty with the plaintiff, and then avail himself of the plea of self-defence." In a previous case- in the same
state,' Aants v. Y7he People, 47 Ill. 376, the court held that while
a man threatened with danger will not be held liable criminally for
an honest mistake as to its imminence, yet "at the same time, he
has not the right to provoke the quarrel and take advantage of it,
and then justify the homicide."
However, it is true that the charge that the defendant must have
been "entirely free" from fault, though more strict than the rule
in other states, still represents the Alabama doctrine. For example, in another case in that state, Howard v. The State, 20 So.
365, Haralson, J., held that, "in order to invoke the doctrine of
self-defence, the law requires that the defendant should have been
free from all fault or wrong doing, which had the effect to provoke
or bring on the difficulty." Two other Alabama cases illustrate
the same rule-Bell v. State, 22 So. 526, and Crazeford'v. Stale,
21 So. 2 x4-where (p. 223) "reasonably free" from fault is distinctly said to be erroneous, and that free from all fault or wrong
doing is correct.
The question as to whether the defendant must have been absolutely free from fault before he can set up the plea of self-defence,
seems to have been little noticed in the text books. In Clark's
Criminal Law, p. 156, it is said, under the title of Homicide, "A
man will not be deemed the aggressor within this rule merely because his acts provoked the difficulty, unless they were calculated
or intended to have that effect."
What has here jbeen called the Alabama Rule is probable, both
legally and morally, the more just. No loophole of escape by the
plea of self-defence should be permitted a wrongdoer, who had the
full intention of quarreling with and injuring another, but who
happens to be shrewd enough to adopt the idea of protecting himself by inciting, by insulting verbal expressions, his opponent to
strike the first blow. The Alabama courts, in ruling that a defendant who wishes to plead self-defence must be free from fault in
povoking the encounter, not only legally in the technical sense,
but entirely free, have taken a step in the right direction. It may
even be that this interpretation of the law has grown up so gradually that the difference between the phrases "free" and "entirely
free" is not fully appreciated by the judges. But, be that as it
may, this stricter rule must certainly have a beneficial influence, in
that it tends to suppress a certain class of criminals ever on the
alert to stir up a stabbing affray, as in the principal, case, on the
slightest provrcation.
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DIVORCE; EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF. A DECREE OF DIVORCE.

In a recent case, Streetwo(lv. Streeftolf, 41 Atl. 876 (1898), theCourt of Chancery of the State of New Jersey refused to recognize
the extraterritorial validity of a decree of divorce granted by
another state under the following circumstances: A husband who,
had resided many years in New Jersey, on being sued by his wife
for a divorce a mensa et thoro and alimony, unknown to anyone
secretly betook himself to a town in North Dakota, where, ninety
days after his arrival, he instituted divorce proceedings against his
wife and obtained a decree for -an absolute divorce. It was apparent that his sole purpose in going to North Dakota was to secure
the decree of divorce, and without any intention of acquiring a
permanent domicile there. It appeared also that he engaged in no
business in that state, and was, in fact, there only a small portion
of the period between his brrival and the institution of the suitThe Court of Chancery set aside the decree upon the grounds that
the husband had not acquired a bonafide, actual domicile in North
Dakota, thereby committing a fraud upon the courts of that state.
A decree of divorce is recognized everywhere when the state
has jurisdiction of the parties and determines the status and rights
of both parties, and generally when only one of the parties is
within the jurisdiction of the state, and the defendant has been
summoned or has voluntarily appeared: Doughty v. Doughty, 28
N. J. Eq. 586 (z876) ; Van fossen v. State, 37 Ohio, 317 (1881).
But this is due to the comity between the states, and does not result.
from the constitutional provision which declares that full faith and
credit shall be given in one state to the judicial proceedings in every
other; for that provision applies only to divorces granted by a
.court which has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter:
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877) ; People v. Baker, 76 N.
But if the state has jurisdiction of neither of the.Y 75 (1879).
parties by reason of their being non-resident, the decree can have
no effect on their status without the state: People v. Dowell, 25.
Mich. 247 (1872).
What, then, is the test of jurisdiction? It is the domicile of theparties. The domicile must be actual and bona fide, and complainant must remain for statutory period: Hood v. State, 56 Ind..
Gregory v. Gregory, 76 Me. 535 (1884); Van
263 (x88o);
Some states hold
Possen v. Van Fossen, 37 Ohio, 37 (i88x).
that, if the complainant bonafide takes" up his domicile in another
state and has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter,
the divorce is valid everywhere: Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S, 714
(1877).
It results from the comity existing among the states, for
no state has the right to dissolve or change the domestic status of
persons belonging to other states: People v. Baker, 76 N. Y.
(1879).
In New Jersey a decree granted in another state, wherethe defendant has been summoned and had actual notice, is recognized-Doughty v. Doughtj,, 28 N. J. Eq. 58i (i8 7 6)-but not
on notice by publication: Flower v. Flower, 42 N. J. Eq. 152'
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(x886).
In New York actual notice, much more notice by publi-cation is not sufficient: O'Dea v. O'Dea, zoi N. Y. 23 (1886);
Peope v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78 (1879). The courts .of Iowa recognize the validity of a divorce as tor both parties obtained on the
domicile of one, with notice of publication to the other: -Van
Arstdal v. Van Arsdia, 67 Iowa, 35 (x885); and the same is true
in Indiana: .Hood.v. State, 56 Ind. 263 (1877).
In Turner v.
Turner, 44 Ala. 437 (1876), the court went so far as to recognize
a divorce granted on behalf of the husband in Indiana, the wife
not having been summoned or having appeared-as to the husband
but not as to the wife-and so granted her a divorce. Other states
also recognize the validity of a divorce granted one of the parties
in another state, while not regarding it as conclusive upon the
-status or rights of the party within its own jurisdiction : Cook v.
Cook, 56 Wis. 195 (1882); W[ght v. Wrigh, 24 Mich. i81
(872); Ste/pAhen v. Stephen, 58 Me. 508 (870); Barrett v:
-Fvrlfitg, III U. S. 523 (1883).
The invalidity of a divorce, due to want of jurisdiction, can be
shown in any proceeding in any court: Litowic v. Litowich, 19
Kans. 45i (1878); Sewall v. Sewall, 122 Mass. i56 (1877);
Peopile v. Dowell, 25 Mich. 247 (1883). In Reedv. Reed, 52
Mich. 1' 7 (1883), the husband had moved into Indiana and taken
up a false domicile and secured a divorce. The Michigan court
went behind the record and declared the divorce void. The same
was held in Gregory v. Gregory, 76 Me. 535 (874).
There is a question whether a decree of divorce obtained by
publication may, as other decrees in equity, be subsequently opened
by the defendant, who had no actual notice. The following courts
hold that it may be: Lawrence v. Lawrence, 73 Ill. 577 (1874) ;
Smith v. Smith, 20 Mo. 166 (1854).
The following hold the
contrary: Afcjunkins v. McJunkins, 3 Ind. 31 (1851) ; Gilruth v.
Gilruth, 20 Iowa, 225 (1866) ; O' Connell v. O'Connell, io Neb.
390 (i88o) ; Lewis v. Lewis, z 5 Kans. 181 (1875).

